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THE DIPLOMATIC DISPUTE 
OVER THE RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 
DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD
The European Commission of the Danube was established in 1856. Its objective was to ensure favourable conditions of navigation in the delta of the river, which 
in the same year gained international status. In the years that followed, the rights of 
the European Commission of the Danube gradually increased until an independent 
Romania suddenly emerged on the political scene, and which claimed sovereign ri-
ghts over the lower part of the river. The dispute with Romania grew even more he-
ated in the inter-war period, and it ended when Romania took over the majority of 
the rights of the European Commission of the Danube in 1938.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE FUNCTIONING 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE
By virtue of Article 16 of the Paris Treaty of 30 March 1856 the European Commission 
of the Danube (which will also be referred to as the European Commission or simply 
the Commission) was established, which consisted of delegates from Austria, France, 
the United Kingdom, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey. Its task was to clear the 
mouth of the river. Funds were raised from navigation tariffs that the delegates set by 
majority vote. It also used loans granted by the governments of the member countries. 
The area that it covered spread from the mouth of the Danube to Isakcia and was, 
at that time, on the territory of Turkey. Admittedly, the southern part of Besarabia, 
bordering the northern branch Kilia was united with Moldova, but Moldova itself re-
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mained a Turkish fiefdom.1 Despite having been established only two years earlier, in 
1958 the European Commission of the Danube’s remit was extended to allow it to fi-
nish everything it had undertaken.2 On 2 November 1865, the signatories of the 1856 
treaty evaluated the work of the European Commission of the Danube in a positive 
way and decided to put it under international protection. The Commission gained 
the exclusive right to administer all the equipment that it set up in order to undertake 
its operations, and to plan and undertake all the works necessary for navigation on the 
middle branch of the Danube: Sulina and on the southern of St. George. Turkey gave 
to the Commission some land on the left-hand bank of the river in the Port of Sulina, 
whose dimensions were 760 m by 50 m, and on the right bank of the river a suitable 
place for building a hospital and administration buildings, on the condition that the 
Commission would pay real estate tax. No equipment could be built in the port of 
Sulina that was not covered by the general plan for the development of the port pre-
pared by the Commission.3
Navigation on the Danube was to take place according to the ‘Rules of navigation 
and police’ adopted by the Commission on 2 November 1865, which was at the same 
time the legal foundation to solve civil disagreements arising from its usage. Control over 
navigation was in the hands of officials nominated by the Sultan; they were the General 
Inspector of the lower Danube and the Captain of the Port of Sulina; the Commision, 
however, could demand their dismissal if they did not follow binding rules.4
These solutions were accepted by the world powers at a conference in Paris on 
28 March 1866. On 24 April 1866 the existence of the Commission was extended 
for five years, and in 1871 for another twelve years, in order to allow it to pay back 
a loan guaranteed by Austro-Hungary, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy 
and Turkey.5 A weakened Turkey and its dependent Romanian duchies tolerated the 
strengthening of the Commission, believing that it was better to have an internatio-
nal administration on the Danube rather than the political influence and rivalry of 
Austria and Russia.6
1 The Archive of New Acts [later AAN], Bucharest 448, ‘Traités, actes, conventions et règlements 
relatifs á la Commission Européenne du Danube (1856-1930)’, Paris 1931, p. 97; ‘Study of the 
Danube navigation of 19 October 1955’, p. 2; W. Dobrzycki, Historia stosunków międzynarodowych 
w czasach nowożytnych 1815-1945, Warszawa 1996, pp. 55-56; L. Bazylow, Historia Rosji, Wrocław 
1969, p. 274.
2 AAN, ‘Traités, actes, conventions…’, p. 99.
3 Ibid., pp. 101-102; NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, 
pp. 34-36; S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube River in the Southeastern European Political and Economic 
Complex from Antiquity to the Conference of Belgrade of 1948, trans. by R.J. Metes, New York 1987, 
p. 295.
4 AAN, ‘Traités, actes, conventions…’, p. 104.
5 Ibid., pp. 108-109; NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, 
pp. 34-36; NA, FO 371/115425, ‘Study of the Danube navigation of 19 October 1955’, p. 2; 
S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube River…, p. 295.
6 C. Atanasiu, Problema suveranităţii României la Dunăre şi “Navigaţia Fluvială Română” (1919-1945), 
Bucureşti 2003, pp. 32-33.
This content downloaded from 
            149.156.234.28 on Fri, 16 Oct 2020 10:49:24 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
167POLITEJA 2/1(10/1)/2008 The Diplomatic Dispute…
The treaty of Berlin on 13 July 1878 resulted in Romania, which had become 
an independent country, ceding to Russia the southern part of Bessarabia with the 
branch Kilia and its southern offshoot, Old Stambul, but it gained some islands in 
the Danube delta, the Isle of Snakes and the whole river delta. Thus Romania be-
came a member of the European Commission of the Danube, whose rights were 
confirmed and its area of operations was extended all the way to Galac. On ‘its own’ 
section of the river the Commission acted ‘completely independently from the ter-
ritorial government.’ The Commission was also given the task of preparing (in agre-
ement with the Danube countries) the rules for navigation and the river police for 
the upper section of the river from the Iron Gate to Galac.7
On 28 May 1881 the member countries of the European Commission decided 
to entrust to their delegates, irrespective of their nationality, the authority to choose 
who should be Inspector of navigation, Chancellor of the control of navigation and 
controllers of navigation of the separate sections of the lower Danube, as well as the 
Captain of the port of Sulima and all his dependent personnel. The officials appoin-
ted by the Commission made all the decisions in its name, including rulings in cases 
that arose from violations of the rules of the river. The Commission also gained con-
trol of its treasury, which had previously been in the hands of a special agent. It had 
its seat at Galac. The Commission regulated a signal system and sanitary rules, and 
it had its own ship and a flag.8
The London treaty signed on 10 March 1883 extended the existence of the 
European Commission of the Danube for 21 years (until 1904). After that period it 
was envisaged that the continued operation of the Commission would be based on 
silent agreements that would be concluded every three years. The Commission’s area 
of operations was extended to Braila, and rules that were drawn-up on 2 June 1882 
were also approved for the sector between Braila and the Iron Gate.9
The rulings of the London treaty encountered Romanian opposition, which was 
not prepared to allow a further extension of the powers of the European Commission 
on its own territory. The main point of disagreement was the section of the river be-
tween Galac and Braila. A Romanian delegate did not put his signature on the treaty 
of 1883, and he did not acknowledge the rules of the Commission from 1882.10
During the First World War, the Central Powers attempted to eliminate the 
European Commission of the Danube. The peace treaty concluded with Romania, in 
Bucharest on 7 May 1918 established the Commission of the Mouth of the Danube, 
which was to carry out purely technical tasks. On 17 May 1918, France, the United 
7 AAN, ‘Traités, actes, conventions…’, p. 112.
8 Ibid., pp. 113-116; NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, 
pp. 37-38.
9 AAN, ‘Traités, actes, conventions…’, pp. 117-118; NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube 
navigation without date’, pp. 37-38; S. G. Focas, The Lower Danube River…, p. 496.
10 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, p. 38; NA, FO 371/115425, 
‘Study of the Danube navigation of 19 October 1955’, pp. 2-3; W. Dobrzycki, Historia stosunków…, 
p. 156; C. Atanasiu, Problema suveranităţii…, p. 33.
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Kingdom and Italy protested against the decisions contained in the Bucharest treaty 
that pertained to the river, claiming that it violated international control of naviga-
tion on the Danube. That principle was subsequently upheld in the peace treaties 
in 1919-1920, which established two Danube commissions: one European and the 
other International; the countries that did not have access to the river had a presence 
on both of them (as third countries).11
The final organization of the principles of navigation on the Danube was under-
taken at a conference at Paris which convened on 2 August 1920 and lasted until 
23 July 1921, when a Convention was signed which was to be the final statute of the 
Danube. The principle of freedom of navigation on the river and the equality of eve-
ry country’s flag was contained within it. The European Commission of the Danube 
was to enforce the rules on that section of the river that was navigable by ocean ships 
(from Braila to the mouth), and the International Commission of the Danube on 
that section that was navigable by river ships (from Ulm to Braila) and on its tribu-
taries which were considered to be international. The European Commission inc-
luded: France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Romania. However, some countries 
that had their own special interests on that part of the river could also apply for the 
membership. The rights of the European Commission remained the same as before 
1914.12
The members of the International Commission of the Danube were Austria, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, the 
United Kingdom, Italy and France. The International Commission, however, beca-
me only a coordinator of technical works undertaken on this section of the Danube 
and it had less extensive rights than the European Commission.13
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ROMANIA AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
In the interwar period both commissions encountered the resistance of some coun-
tries, which opposed the international administration of the Danube and wanted to 
defend their sovereignty. The Romanian government, in particular, made a claim 
against the European Commission in an attempt to take over most of its rights.
11 AAN, ‘Traités, actes, conventions…’, pp. 119-122; Traktat pokoju między mocarstwami sprzymier-
zonymi i stowarzyszonymi a Niemcami podpisany w Wersalu 28 czerwca 1919 r., Warszawa 1919 (The 
Peace Treaty signed between Great Powers and allied countries and Germany signed at Versailles 
28 July 1919), pp. 162-163; C. Atanasiu, Problema suveranităţii…, pp. 91-92.
12 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, pp. 38-40; C. Atanasiu, 
Problema suveranităţii…, pp. 97-112.
13 NA, FO 371/115425, ‘Study of the Danube navigation of 19 X 1955’, pp. 3-4; C. Atanasiu, 
Problema suveranităţii…, pp. 97-112; Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe [later AMAER], 
fond CID, Vol. 19, ‘Unsigned memorandum of 12 June 1945’; AMAER, fond CID, Vol. 99, 
‘Memorandum without date abort the legal situation of the Iron Gate’; Archivele Naţionale, Fond 
Stoica Vasile I/148, ‘Memorandum of the government of Romania of 12 June 1945’, p. 173.
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Since 1883 Romania had invariably questioned the legal rights of the Commission 
between Galac and Braila, and asserted that its authority over this section of the river 
was only of a technical character. Romania wanted to eliminate the double jurisdic-
tion at Sulina, where the port remained under the control of the Commission.
On 6 September 1924 the governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy 
turned to the secretary general of the League of the Nations with a motion that requ-
ested that the League attempt to resolve the existing dispute. The motion was adop-
ted by the Advisory and Technical Committee of Communication and Transit of the 
League of the Nations which appointed a special committee to look into the matter. 
The committee ruled that the European Commission could execute legal rights be-
tween Galac and Braila but only by applied practice and through the letter of the tre-
aty. On 18 September 1926, in view of the ambiguous answer of the committee, the 
governments of Romania, France, Italy and the United Kingdom placed three qu-
estions before the International Tribunal at the Hague: firstly, whether the European 
Commission had the same rights between Galac and Braila as below Galac; secondly, 
if the European commission had the same authority on the section between Galac 
and Braila and whether its jurisdiction covered only the canal of Sulina or whether 
it also included the ports that remained under Romanian authority; thirdly, if the 
European Commission did not have the same authority in the sector Galac-Braila 
as below Galac, then what should be the line of division between the rights of the 
European Commission and Romania?14
On 8 December 1927, the International Tribunal at the Hague ruled with nine 
votes against one that in accordance with the Statute of the Danube and the Barcelona 
Convention (20 April 1921) the European Commission of the Danube had on the 
section from Galac to Braila the same rights as below Galac. The Tribunal also ruled 
that the authority of the Commission extended also to the banks of the river and to 
its ports to the extent that it would serve to preserve the freedom of navigation on 
the Danube. When it came to distinguishing between the rights of the European 
Commission and the Romanian government in the ports of Braila and Galac, it was 
ruled that Romania could exercise its authority insofar that it did not interfere with 
the rights of the Commission.15
The League’s ruling formed the basis of an agreement concluded by Romania, the 
United Kingdom and Italy on 20 March 1929, which gave the European Commission 
control of the river police between the mouth of the Danube and the port at Braila. 
The port at Sulina remained under the Commission’s authority, whereas the river 
police in other ports and on the banks of the river were to remain under control of 
Romania, and they were to discharge their duties without breaking the rules of the 
Commission. Navigational courts were established with the purpose of investigating 
14 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, pp. 40-41; S.G. Focas, The 
Lower Danube River…, pp. 500-501, 503-506.
15 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, pp. 41- 42; S. G. Focas, The 
Lower Danube River…, pp. 505-506; C. Atanasiu, Problema suveranităţii…, pp. 121-122.
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all cases in which the laws of the river had been broken. In Galac an appellate court 
was to be established which would consist of representatives of the Commission and 
two representatives of Romania. Its final rulings were to be made in the name of the 
Romanian monarch. The rights of the inspector of navigation of the Commission 
were limited to the ships which were on the river. The ships coming to the port were 
under the authority of the Captain of the port of Sulina.16
Executing the agreement when it came to the organization of navigational courts 
encountered some difficulties. According to the Romanian constitution one could 
appeal the court of Galac’s rulings to the Appellate court in Bucharest and to the 
Constitutional Court. There was not enough money, however, to establish a new co-
urt system. Finally, on 13 March 1932 the members of the European Commission 
decided at a meeting in Paris that the conditions were not favourable for the propo-
sed reform of the legal system because of technical difficulties and the financial pro-
blems of the Commission and Romania.17
Another agreement (modus vivendi) was concluded by the delegates of the 
Commission on 10 May 1933: the Commission was allowed to carry out its techni-
cal and judicial rights between the mouth of the Danube and Braila, but withdrew 
from exercising its judicial rights between Galac and Braila. On 25 June 1933 ano-
ther modus vivendi was concluded: Romania agreed to stop undermining the rights 
of the European Commission on the section from the mouth of the river to Braila, 
and the Commission decided not to enforce its judicial rights between Galac and 
Braila. The ships directed by the Commission’s pilots were under its jurisdiction be-
low Galac. When a ship called at Galac it would fall under Romanian jurisdiction 
and the Commission’s pilot would be replaced by a Romanian pilot. After leaving 
Galac the ship was again to be boarded by a pilot of the Commission.18
Romania treated the Semmerling agreement as a temporary affair and did not 
abandon its endeavours to limit the rights of the European Commission. The 
Romanian Foreign Minister (in the years 1932-1936) Nicolae Titulescu maintained 
that Romania remained under the ‘yoke of international sovereignty’, and that the 
European Commission is ‘an unbelievable anachronism, foreign supervision will not 
be accepted on native soil.’ And a long-term delegate of Romania on the Commission, 
Constantin Contescu, argued that the Commission with its ‘archaic regime and so-
vereign rights,’ should be disbanded, and that if it continued to function, it would 
constitute scandalous proof of a lack of confidence in the Romanian state.’19
Romania drew attention to its sovereign rights that conflicted with the 
Commission’s sphere of operations. In 1931 Romania abolished a free trade zone 
16 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, p. 42; S.G. Focas, The Lower 
Danube River…, pp. 511-512.
17 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, p. 42; C. Atanasiu, Problema 
suveranităţii…, pp. 121-123.
18 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, pp. 42-43; S.G. Focas, The 
Lower Danube River…, pp. 513-514; C. Atanasiu, Problema suveranităţii…, p. 124.
19 S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube River…, p. 516.
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in Sulina.20 On 21 June 1934 it unilaterally introduced a regulation that stated that 
a ship which had an accident would have to pay a rescue fee on the territory con-
trolled by the European Commission of the Danube. When British, French and 
Italian envoys protested, the Romanian side answered that the treaties which had 
been signed did not limit the rights of Romania to levy such a tax. Questions that 
were posed about the abolition of the free trade zone in Sulina were not answered.21 
Subsequent interventions made by the governments of the United Kingdom, France 
and Italy concerning the case of Sulina and the rescue fee continued to be met with 
silence.22
The aim of Romania was to regain control over the whole port of Sulina. During 
the spring session of the European Commission of the Danube in 1935 a Romanian 
delegate, Contescu, raised that matter without success. Whereas delegates from 
France and Italy were reasonably willing to reach a compromise, a British delegate 
refused even to talk about this subject. Contescu, in return, accused the Commission 
of not having paid several communal taxes or the instalments that were used for the 
upkeep of the fire brigade. The Romanian delegate maintained that, although in the 
past nobody had asked the Commission to make these payments, it could no longer 
refuse to pay these fees. The sums involved were not huge and they were made by 
other diplomatic posts; nevertheless, a British delegate, Douglas Keane, recognized 
that, given that the atmosphere around the European Commission had taken on the 
aura of a general witch-hunt, Contescu’s speech amounted to harassment.23
Finally, the United Kingdom agreed to the payment of communal taxes by the 
European Commission of the Danube, but it refused to accede to the Romanian de-
cision concerning the abolition of the free trade zone in Sulina and the imposition 
of the rescue tax, which was, according to it, a breach of the rights of the European 
Commission of the Danube and a ruling of the court at the Hague from 8 December 
1927.24
The diminishing authority of the United Kingdom and France encouraged 
Romania to continue its fight to weaken the European Commission of the Danube. 
Moreover, Turkey’s success when it came to its own dispute over the Straits acted as 
an additional spur. The convention signed at Montreux on 20 July 1936 dissolved 
the International Commission for the Straits, and the Turkish government took over 
the rights it had previously possessed. Turkey gained the right to fortify the banks 
20 NA, FO 371/19 527, ‘A note from the French Ministry of the Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy 
in Paris of 16 April 1935’, p. 116.
21 NA, FO 371/19 527, ‘A Letter from the Italian Embassy in London to Owena O’Malley (the 
Foreign Office) of 6 February 1935’, p. 109.
22 NA, FO 371/19 527, ‘A Letter from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy 
in Paris of 27 April 1954’, p. 120.
23 NA, FO 371/19 527, ‘Report of Douglas Keane to the Foreign Office of 14 May 1935’, p. 129.
24 NA, FO 371/19 527, ‘A note from the British Embassy In Bucharest to the Minister of the Foreign 
Affairs of Romania of 25 May 1935’, pp. 133-135; NA, FO 371/19 527, A Letter from the British 
Treasury to the Foreign Office of 20 August 1935, p. 137.
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of the straits and to deploy military units there. All merchant ships had the right to 
freely pass through the straits during peacetime and neutral ships during war. Turkey 
agreed to allow military ships to pass through the straits during peacetime, but du-
ring war it had the right to impose restrictions that accorded with its own interests. 
Thus, it gained full control over the straits, which was a favourable precedent for 
Romania.25
The next step taken against the international control of rivers was made by 
Germany, which rejected on 14 November 1936 the river clauses of the Versailles 
Treaty. This meant that it withdrew from all river commissions of which it was a mem-
ber (including the International Commission of the Danube) Then, in 1938, the 
German delegation under the direction of George Martius proposed to the Danube 
countries, which included Romania, that navigation on the Danube should be ba-
sed on new principles. The international Danube organizations would be replaced 
by a council of a purely technical character. The council would not have permanent 
representatives, and the agreement by which it would be established would not be ra-
tified by any country. The Danube countries would take control of the river, and the 
third countries (the United Kingdom, France, and Italy) would lose their influence 
within the organization and control of navigation.26
This project was something what the Danube countries had been waiting for, but 
the fact that it had been presented by the Third Reich at a time when it was beco-
ming more powerful did not engender any enthusiasm. The Danube countries reac-
ted cautiously to this proposal, despite the fact that it would remove control over na-
vigation from the United Kingdom and France, as they were afraid that they might 
end up having to stand up to the might of Germany by themselves.27
25 S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube River…, p. 515; H. Batowski, Między dwiema wojnami 1919-1939. 
Zarys historii dyplomatycznej, Kraków 1988, p. 280.
26 S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube River…, p. 518; I write about it more in the article ‘Problem 
obecności Niemiec w Komisjach Dunajskich w okresie międzywojennym’, Studia z Dziejów Rosji 
i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Vol. 42 (2007), pp. 80, 83.
27 NA, FO 371/22387, ‘Telegram of Hoare to the Foreign Office of 7 June 1938’, p. 91; NA, FO 
371/22388, ‘A Letter from the Czechoslovak diplomatic mission of 7 June 1938 to Jan Masaryk’, 
pp. 103-104; NA, FO 371/22388, ‘A Letter of Masaryk of 9 August 1938 to the Foreign Office’, 
pp. 182-184; NA, FO 371/22388, ‘A Letter from A. Gascoigne from Budapest to Foreign Office 
of 10 July 1938’, pp. 134-136, 139; NA, FO 371/22388, ‘A Report of Keane from a meeting with 
Despar of 27 July 1938’, pp. 159-161; NA, FO 371/22388, ‘A Letter from the French Embassy 
in London to the Foreign Office of 9 July 1938, from Roché’, pp. 116-118; NA, FO 371/22388, 
‘A Letter from A. Gascoigne from Budapest to the Foreign Office of 10 July 1938’, p. 139; NA, 
FO 371/22388, ‘A Note In Foreign Office made after a parliamentary question of 14 July 1938’, 
pp. 120-121; AMAER, fond CID, Vol. 97, ‘Telegram of Bossy of 2 July 1938 from Budapest’; 
AMAER, fond CID, Vol. 97, ‘A Report of the conversations of Brauer and Martius in Belgrade 
of 3 July 1938’; AMAER, fond CID, Vol. 97, ‘A Note to the French Embassy in Bucharest of 
5 July 1938 from the Romanian Ministry of the Foreign Affairs ER’; AMAER, fond CID, Vol. 
97, ‘Telegram from the Romanian diplomatic mission in Bucharest of 6 July 1938’; AMAER, 
fond CID, Vol. 97, ‘Telegram from the Romanian diplomatic mission in Sofia of 19 July 1938’; 
S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube River…, pp. 518-519.
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The German proposal helped to facilitate a compromise between Romania, 
France, the United Kingdom and Italy. On the one hand, Romania supported the 
presence of third countries when it came to control of navigation on the Danube; on 
the other, the United Kingdom and France decided to make concessions as far as the 
rights of the European Commission of the Danube were concerned. The compromi-
se was concluded at a conference at Sinaia, which began 8 August 1938. ‘Agreement 
concerning the exercise of the rights of the European Commission of the Danube’ 
was signed on 18 August 1938 by Romania, Great Britain and France. Italy, which 
did not take part in the conference, set as a condition of its agreement the introduc-
tion of some small amendments and the acceptance of Germany as a member of the 
European Commission of the Danube. This condition was easy to fulfil, as all the 
members of the Commission were of an opinion that Germany had to participate 
because it would be less dangerous within the Commission than if it were left out-
side of it. Finally, by virtue of an agreement reached at Bucharest on 1 March 1939 
Germany was accepted into the Commission, and it signed together with Italy the 
agreement of Sinaia. These acts were ratified by Romania on 30 March 1939, and by 
the other powers between 6 and 9 May 1939.28
By virtue of the agreement of Sinaia, the European Commission of the Danube 
lost its right to set the rules of navigation. Romania gained this right and was also to 
be responsible for policing it. The disputes that arose as a result of the breaking of 
the rules of navigation were to be decided in the first instance by Romanian courts, 
and the Appellate Court at Galac became a court of appeal. The Maritime Authority 
of the Danube was established, as an institution which was fundamentally Romanian 
and not international. The Authority planned and executed essential projects, and 
proposed the rates of navigational fees and charged them. The role of the European 
Commission of the Danube was limited to confirming or modifying proposed plans. 
It was to confirm the rates of payments and to ensure that they were made regularly 
and were fairly shared. The Commission was also to service the loans that had been 
previously extended to it.29
The results of the Sinaia conference were regarded in Romania as a gesture of hi-
storic justice. The symbolic handing over of power by the European Commission of 
the Danube took place during its session from 13 to 26 May 1939. The Romanian 
delegate, Constantin Contescu, had planned for 16 May 1939, a solemn replace-
ment of the flag of the European Commission. From now on, the Romanian flag was 
28 NA, FO 371/22386, ‘A Project of the Romanian answer of 14 December 1938 to the Italy’s 
proposition to join the agreement of Sinaia’, pp. 250-253; NA, FO 371/22386, ‘Telegram from 
Bucharest to the Foreign Office from Reginald Hoare of 15 December 1938’, pp. 235-236; NA, 
FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, p. 43; AAN, The Polish Embassy 
in Bucharest 449, ‘A report of Adam Mikucki of 30 August 1938’; S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube 
River…, p. 521.
29 NA, FO 371/158608, ‘Study of the Danube navigation without date’, pp. 43-44; I write more 
about the conference at Sinaia in the article ‘Konferencja europejska w Sinaia w sierpniu 1938 
roku’, Rocznik Wschodni, No. 9 (2003), pp. 211-222.
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supposed to fly on all buildings that were taken over by the Romanian authorities. 
There was, however, some controversy over the issue of the palace at Sulina, which 
remained the Commission’s property. Contescu maintained that the building stood 
on Romanian soil, and decided to hoist the Romanian flag over it too. The British 
delegate, Douglas Keane, strongly objected to this. He threatened to boycott the ce-
remony if the flag of the European Commission disappeared from its seat. Contescu 
reluctantly yielded as he was afraid that the British delegate would cause a scandal. 
When the ceremony began, and the flag of the European Commission in front of the 
palace at Sulina was being slowly lowered, Contescu rushed to prevent its removal. 
Douglas Keane supported the international character of the Commission and was 
convinced of the greatness of its task. When the Romanian anthem began to be play-
ed, he watched Contescu’s hasty intervention with unconcealed satisfaction.30
In his monograph devoted to the lower Danube, Spiridon G. Focas treated the con-
ference at Sinaia as representing a complete capitulation of the European Great Powers, 
which was forced by Romanian claims and German expansion into the Balkans.31 The 
decisions of the conference at Sinaia signified, however, that the principle of inter-
national control over the international river was dropped in order to fulfil the natio-
nal interest of a particular Danube country. This precedent was later used by other 
Danube countries, which wanted to jettison international control over their sections 
of the river. The fact that Romania took control over the lower Danube did not esta-
blish its security in the region. After the outbreak of the Second World War, Romania 
had to fight Soviet attempts to take over control of the delta. After the outbreak of the 
German-Soviet war the Danube became the exclusive supply-route for the German 
and Romanian armies fighting in the east. The decisions taken at the conference at 
Sinaia to some extent broke the principle of the freedom of navigation on the Danube, 
which was only completely abandoned during the Cold War when the Danube beca-
me an internal river for the countries of the Soviet bloc. This situation was only altered 
with the collapse of the Communist regimes in 1989 and 1990s.
Translated by Bogdan Zieliński
30 AAN, The Polish Embassy In Bucharest 449, ‘A report of Adam Mikucki of 30 August 1938’; NA, 
FO 371/25158, ‘A Letter of Keane of 1 June 1939’, pp. 113-115.
31 S.G. Focas, The Lower Danube River…, p. 518.
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